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615 
AMBIGUITY IN THE REALM OF DEFAMATION: 
RHETORICAL HYPERBOLE OR PROVABLE FALSITY? 
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
KINGS COUNTY 
Gorilla Coffee, Inc. v. New York Times Co.1 
(decided August 8, 2011) 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In Gorilla Coffee, Inc. v. New York Times Co.,2 the Supreme 
Court of Kings County held that statements made by employees con-
cerning their work environment were not defamatory because the 
statements, which appeared on an online blog of the New York Times 
website, when viewed in the context of the entire post were ―too sub-
jective and vague to be considered anything more than an opinion.‖3  
The court reasoned that a reasonable reader of the employees‘ state-
ments, which criticized their work environment as being ―perpetually 
malicious, hostile, and demeaning,‖ would conclude that the state-
ments were based on the employees‘ own perception as opposed to 
an external source of information.4  Moreover, nothing included in 
the statements was ―capable of being objectively shown to be true or 
false.‖5  Furthermore, the contention that the statement was merely a 
subjective grievance by disgruntled employees became even more 
obvious when coupled with the context of the post—an ongoing labor 
dispute.6 
Plaintiff, Gorilla Coffee, a wholesale seller of coffee located 
in the Park Slope section of Brooklyn, and Dareen Scherer, its sole 
 
1 No. 25520/2010, 2011 WL 3502777 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 8, 2011). 
2 Id. at *5. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Gorilla, 2011 WL 3502777, at *5. 
1
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shareholder, brought an action for defamation against its former em-
ployees, the New York Times, and Oliver Strand, a columnist for the 
Times, for defamatory statements made by the employees that were 
published on the website‘s blog, ―the City Room.‖7  The dispute be-
gan when the Times posted an article by Oliver Strand on the City 
Room blog regarding a dispute that resulted in the closing of Park 
Slope coffee shop.8  This post was followed by an additional article 
written by Strand that included statements made by former em-
ployees of Gorilla Coffee and was later updated to include the alle-
gedly defamatory statements.9 
The Supreme Court of Kings County indicated that in order to 
establish an actionable claim for defamation, it is first necessary to 
assess ―whether the statements were defamatory in the first place.‖10  
If the statements are defamatory, then it must be determined ―whether 
the statements constituted such an attack on the corporation‘s busi-
ness reputation so as to be actionable without proof of special dam-
ages.‖11  According to the court, defamation is ― ‗the making of a 
false statement of fact which tends to expose the plaintiff to public 
contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace.‘ ‖12  In order for statements 
to be defamatory, it must be established that a reasonable ―reader 
would perceive the alleged defamatory statements made were state-
ments of fact‖ and not opinion, because it is well established that ex-
pressions of opinion ―are constitutionally protected.‖13 
 
7 Id. at *1. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at *1-2.  The alleged defamatory statement made by employees and posted on the 
blog by Strand stated: 
             We the workers would have preferred to keep this between the 
people involved, thus our silence towards the press.  However, we do 
feel it is important to clarify the situation for the friends and patrons of 
Gorilla Coffee.  The issues brought up with the owners of Gorilla Coffee 
yesterday are issues that they have been aware of for some time.  These 
issues which have repeatedly been brushed aside and ignored have 
created a perpetually malicious, hostile, and demeaning work environ-
ment that was not only unhealthy, but also, as our actions have clearly 
shown, unworkable. 
Id. 
10 Gorilla, 2011 WL 3502777, at *2. 
11 Id. (citing First Nat‘l Bank of Waverly, N.Y. v. Winters, 121 N.E. 459, 460-61 (N.Y. 
1918)). 
12 Id. (quoting Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1311 (N.Y. 1977)). 
13 Id. at *3 (citing Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 501 N.E.2d 550, 550-53 (N.Y. 1986)).            
2
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In articulating the standard to be applied for determining 
whether a statement is defamatory, the court referred to Immuno AG 
v. Moor Jankowski,14 which emphasizes that the New York Constitu-
tion provides even broader protection of free speech than the United 
States Constitution.15  The court in Immuno retraced New York‘s 
―[early] history of a constitutionally guaranteed liberty of the press‖ 
and its ―tradition . . . of providing the broadest possible protection to 
‗the sensitive role of gathering and disseminating news.‘ ‖16 
In evaluating whether the statements made were defamatory, 
the court relied on precedent set by the New York Court of Appeals 
in Steinhilber v. Alphonse,17 which provided four factors to consider 
in distinguishing fact from opinion.18  These factors include: 
(1) [A]n assessment of whether the specific language 
in issue has a precise meaning which is readily unders-
tood or whether it is indefinite and ambiguous; (2) a 
determination of whether the statement is capable of 
being objectively characterized as true or false; (3) an 
examination of the full context of the communication 
in which the statement appears; and (4) a considera-
tion of the broader social context or setting surround-
ing the communication including the existence of any 
applicable customs or conventions which might ―sig-
nal to readers or listeners that what is being read or 
 
In Steinhilber, the court stated that an opinion ―receives the Federal constitutional protection 
accorded to the expression of ideas, no matter how vituperative or unreasonable it may be.‖  
Steinhilber, 501 N.E.2d at 552.  
14 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 1991). 
15 Id. at 1278.  Compare N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 (McKinney‘s 2002) (―Every citizen may 
freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the 
abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or 
of the press.  In all criminal prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may be given in 
the evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is 
true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquit-
ted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.‖), with U.S. CONST. 
amend. I (―Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the 
right of the people peacefully to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of 
grievances.‖). 
16 Immuno, 567 N.E.2d at 1277. 
17 501 N.E.2d 550, 554 (N.Y. 1986). 
18 Id. 
3
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heard is likely to be opinion, not fact.‖19 
Moreover, the court distinguished between pure opinions and 
mixed opinions, the latter of which are opinions based upon undis-
closed facts that insinuate that the opinion is really an assertion of 
fact.20  While opinions are constitutionally protected, mixed opinions 
may be actionable.21  According to the court, the rigorous task of de-
termining whether a statement constitutes opinion or mixed opinion 
is accomplished by considering the context of the statement in its en-
tirety and asking whether a reasonable person would infer ―the asser-
tion of undisclosed facts justifying the opinion.‖22  In applying this 
test, the court considered Gross v. New York Times Co.,23 where the 
New York Court of Appeals held that statements made in articles 
published in the New York Times concerning Elliot Gross, the City‘s 
Chief Medical Examiner, were actionable because they included        
― ‗defamatory assertions that a reasonable reader would understand to 
be advanced as statements of fact.‘ ‖24  The court reasoned that where 
undisclosed facts form the basis of a statement, the reader is less like-
ly to question the integrity of the statement, automatically perceiving 
it as the truth.25  The court exemplified this notion by explaining that 
―the statement ‗John is a thief‘ ‖ is no more or less actionable than 
the statement ― ‗I believe John is a thief.‘ ‖26  Thus, camouflaging a 
statement in the form of an opinion does not necessarily shield it 
from being found defamatory.27  Relying on this precedent the court 
 
19 Id. (quoting Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979-80 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
20 Gorilla, 2011 WL 3502777, at *4. 
21 Steinhilber, 501 N.E.2d at 552-53 (―The actionable element of a ‗mixed opinion‘ is not 
the false opinion itself—it is the implication that the speaker knows certain facts, unknown 
to his audience, which support his opinion and are detrimental to the person about whom he 
is speaking.‖ (citing Rand v. New York Times Co., 430 N.Y.S.2d 271, 274 (App. Div. 1st 
Dep‘t 1980))). 
22 Gorilla, 2011 WL 3502777, at *4 (quoting Steinhilber, 501 N.E.2d at 553). 
23 623 N.E.2d 1163 (N.Y. 1993). 
24 Gorilla, 2011 WL 3502777, at *4 (quoting Gross, 623 N.E.2d at 1166).  The facts in the 
article included accusations that Gross took part in ―cover-ups, directed the creation of ‗mis-
leading‘ autopsy reports and was guilty of ‗possibly illegal‘ conduct—that, although couched 
in the language of hypothesis or conclusion, actually would be understood by the reasonable 
reader as assertions of fact.‖  Gross, 623 N.E.2d at 1168. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 1169. 
27 Id.; see People ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso, 801 N.Y.S.2d 584, 586 (App. Div. 1st Dep‘t 
2005) (finding statements actionable where a Chairman of the New York Stock Exchange 
made statements alluding to a particular undisclosed report); Guerrero v. Carva, 779 
4
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in Gorilla concluded that a reasonable reader would not perceive the 
statements made by employees as being based on any undisclosed 
facts.28  To the contrary, a reasonable reader would infer that the 
statements were merely an expression of the employees‘ discernment 
with working conditions.29 
II. THE FEDERAL APPROACH TO DEFAMATION 
A. Heightening the Standard: From Public Officials to 
Matters of Public Concern 
In New York Times v. Sullivan,30 the United States Supreme 
Court for the first time imposed constitutional limits on state libel 
laws by restricting public officials from recovering on libel actions 
unless they demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the de-
famatory statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or reck-
less disregard for its truth or falsity.31  In Sullivan, a Commissioner of 
the City of Montgomery, Alabama, whose duties included supervis-
ing the police department, brought an action for civil libel against the 
New York Times for statements made concerning alleged events dur-
ing the Civil Rights Movement in a full-page advertisement con-
tained in the newspaper.32  While none of the statements mentioned 
 
N.Y.S.2d 12, 20 (App. Div. 1st Dep‘t 2004) (finding that defendants‘ statements were ac-
tionable because they made general accusations using assertions and provided no basis for 
those assertions). 
28 Gorilla, 2011 WL 3502777, at *5. 
29 Id. 
30 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
31 Id. at 279-80. 
32 Id. at 256.  The advertisement entitled ―Heed Their Rising Voices‖ concerned the ef-
forts of Southern Negro students engaging in non-violent demonstrations ―in positive affir-
mation of the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed by the United States Constitution 
and Bill of Rights.‖  Id.  The advertisement further described how the efforts of the innocent 
demonstrators were being ransacked by ―an unprecedented wave of terror.‖  Id.  Two por-
tions of the text contained the alleged libelous statements.  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256.  The 
first portion stated: 
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang ‗My Country, ‗Tis of 
Thee‘ on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school 
and truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear gas ringed the Al-
abama State College Campus.  When the entire student body protested to 
state authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was pad-
locked in an attempt to starve them into submission. 
5
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the Commissioner by name, he asserted that the reference to police 
implicated him because it was his duty to supervise the Montgomery 
Police Department.33  The Court conceded that some statements were 
inaccurate portrayals of events that occurred in Montgomery.34  At 
trial, the judge instructed the jury that the statements were ―libelous 
per se‖ and that the newspaper should be held liable if it was found 
that the statements were ―of and concerning‖ the Commissioner.35  
Hence, because the statements were libelous per se, falsity and malice 
were presumed.36  The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the rul-
ing.37  However, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding 
 
Id. at 257. 
The second portion stated: 
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King‘s peace-
ful protests with intimidation and violence.  They have bombed his home 
almost killing his wife and child.  They have assaulted his person.  They 
have arrested him seven times- for ‗speeding,‘ ‗loitering‘ and similar ‗of-
fenses.‘  And now they have charged him with ‗perjury‘—a felony under 
which they could imprison him for ten years. . . . 
Id. at 257-58. 
33 Id. at 258.  Thus, according to the Commissioner he was implicitly accused of ― ‗ring-
ing‘ the campus with police‖ and of ―padlocking the dining hall in order to starve students 
into submission.‖  Id.  He also contended that he was accused of arresting Dr. King seven 
times, answering protests ―with ‗intimidation and violence,‘ bombing his home, assaulting 
his person, and charging him with perjury.‖  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 258. 
34 Id.  The students who sang on the Capital steps did not sing ‗My Country, ‗Tis of Thee,‘ 
but sang the National Anthem; students were expelled not for taking part in the demonstra-
tion but for demanding service at a lunch counter in the Montgomery County Courthouse on 
a different occasion; the boycott by students was carried out by them skipping classes for 
one day and did not involve a refusal to register for classes; and the dining hall was never 
padlocked.  Id. at 258-59. 
35 Id. at 267.  Under Alabama law, a statement is libelous per se if the words used ―injure 
[the public official] in his public office, or impute misconduct to him in his office, or want of 
official integrity, or want of fidelity to a public trust.‖  Id.  In order to state a valid claim, the 
jury must ordinarily find that the statement concerns the plaintiff, however, if the plaintiff 
were a government official, then his position would be sufficient ―to support a finding that 
his reputation has been affected by statements that reflect upon the agency of which he is in 
charge.‖  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 267.  Once this is established, the only defense the defendant 
has is to prove that the statements made were true.  Id. 
36 Id. at 262.  The trial judge rejected the argument that the findings violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments mandate of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.  Id. at 262-
63. 
37 Id. at 263.  The Supreme Court of Alabama stated that ― ‗[w]here the words published 
tend to injure a person libeled by them in his reputation, profession, trade or business, or 
charge him with an indictable offense, or tends to bring the individual into public contempt,‘ 
they are ‗libelous per se.‘ ‖  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 263 (alteration in original).  The Court 
agreed with the jury‘s finding that the statements made were of and concerning the Commis-
sioner because ―the average person knows that municipal agents, such as police . . . are under 
6
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that Alabama law inadequately protects freedom of speech and free-
dom of the press afforded by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in 
libel actions brought by public officials.38  The Court declared that 
―libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limita-
tions‖ and asserted that ―[i]t must be measured by standards that sa-
tisfy the First Amendment.‖39  The Court reasoned that the adver-
tisement at issue was ―an expression of grievance and protest on a 
significant public issue of our time‖; thus, it should be protected un-
der the First Amendment because the interest of the public in voicing 
its concerns outweighs the interest of protecting a public official‘s 
reputation.40  Moreover, the Court asserted that along with the title of 
official comes expected criticism.41  The Court declared, ―If judges 
 
the control and direction . . . of a single commissioner.‖  Id. 
38 Id. at 264. 
39 Id. at 269.  The Supreme Court retraced the historical roots of the freedom of expres-
sion and indicated that the constitutional safeguard of the First Amendment ― ‗was fashioned 
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people.‘ ‖  Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 
(1957)); see Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) (―[I]t is a prized American pri-
vilege to speak one‘s mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institu-
tions.‖); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (―The maintenance of the oppor-
tunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will 
of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to 
the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.‖); 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled in part by 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  The Court in Whitney stated: 
            Those who won our independence believed . . . that public dis-
cussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental prin-
ciple of the American government.  They recognized the risks to which 
all human institutions are subject.  But they knew that order cannot be 
secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is 
hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds 
repression, that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable govern-
ment; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely sup-
posed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for 
evil counsels is good ones.  Believing in the power of reason as applied 
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the 
argument of force in its worst form.  Recognizing the occasional tyran-
nies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free 
speech and assembly should be guaranteed. 
Id. at 375-76.  The United States‘ strong commitment to freedom of speech is further evi-
denced by its condemnation of the Sedition Act of 1798, which made it a crime to ―write, 
print, utter or publish any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the 
government of the United States.‖  Sullivan, 276 U.S. at 273-74. 
40 Id. at 271-73. 
41 Id. at 299 (Black, J., concurring) (―In a democratic society, one who assumes to act for 
7
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are to be treated as ‗men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy cli-
mate,‘ surely the same must be true of other government officials, 
such as elected city commissioners.‖42  Consequently, the Court rea-
soned that a rule which mandates that all critics of official conduct 
must prove the truth of all factual assertions in order to escape liabili-
ty in libel actions will stifle freedom of speech by deterring criticism 
due to fear that truth cannot be proven in a court of law.43  Essential-
ly, the Court provided that in order to afford citizens adequate consti-
tutional protection there must be ―a federal rule that prohibits a public 
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating 
to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made 
with ‗actual malice‘—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.‖44 
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,45 the United States Supreme 
Court extended the constitutional protection implemented for public 
officials to public figures.46  Although the defamatory statements 
concerned a college football coach, the Court reasoned that the views 
and actions of ― ‗public figures‘ . . . with respect to public issues and 
events are often of as much concern to the citizen as the attitudes and 
behavior of ‗public officials‘ with respect to the same issues and 
 
the citizens in an executive, legislative, or judicial capacity must expect that his officials acts 
will be commented upon and criticized.‖). 
42 Id. at 273 (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947)). 
43 Id. at 279 n.19.  (―Even a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribu-
tion to public debate, since it brings about ‗the clearer perception and livelier impression of 
truth, produced by its collision with error.‘ ‖ (quoting JOHN STEWART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1947))). 
44 Sullivan, 276 U.S. at 279-80.  Based on the assertion, the Court found that there was no 
evidence that the statements in the New York Times concerning the commissioner were 
made with malice; thus, the Court found no constitutional support for any judgment against 
the defendants.  Id. at 285-86.  The Court clarified that although the New York Times failed 
to check the accuracy of the statements, this at most constituted a finding of negligence, 
which is not sufficient to demonstrate the recklessness necessary to sustain a finding of ac-
tual malice.  Id. at 287-88. 
45 388 U.S. 130 (1967).  Butts involved alleged defamatory statements published in the 
Post that charged Coach Wally Butts of the University of Georgia with conspiring to fix a 
football game.  Id. at 135.  Because Butts was a college coach paid by a private alumni asso-
ciation, he did not qualify as a public official under Sullivan.  Id.  However, the Court al-
lowed the constitutional protection for critics to extend to statements made concerning public 
figures.  Id. at 146. 
46 Id. at 155.  According to the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 
(1974), ―Those who, by reason of notoriety of their achievements or vigor and success with 
which they seek the public‘s attention, are properly classed as public figures . . . .‖ 
8
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events.‖47  Therefore, the protection of the New York Times privilege 
is applicable to defamatory statements concerning public officials and 
public figures.48 
Later in Gertz v. Welch, Inc.,49 the United States Supreme 
Court distinguished between public and private individuals, empha-
sizing the need for a balance between safeguarding an individual‘s 
right to freedom of speech and safeguarding an individual‘s right to 
the protection of his own good reputation.50  The Court asserted that 
private individuals are more deserving of recovery because they have 
not voluntarily availed themselves to the spotlight and are more vul-
nerable to injury due to lack of opportunity to rebut false statements 
through the effective channels of communication that are afforded to 
pubic individuals.51  However, the Court also proclaimed that when 
the plaintiff is a private individual, the alleged defamatory speech in-
volves a matter of public concern, and the defendant is a media pub-
lisher, the plaintiff must meet a higher burden by demonstrating that 
the statements were made with some level of culpability.52  Neverthe-
less, the Court concluded that a different rule should be applied to de-
 
47 Curtis, 388 U.S. at 162; see id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring); 
[A]lthough . . . not subject to the restraints of the political process, ―pub-
lic figures,‖ like ―public officials,‖ often play an influential role in order-
ing society.  And surely as a class these ―public figures‖ have as ready 
access as ―public officials‖ to mass media of communication, both to in-
fluence policy and to counter criticism of their views and activities.  Our 
citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such 
persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about 
their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the 
case of ―public officials.‖  The fact that they are not amendable to the re-
straints of the political process only underscores the legitimate and sub-
stantial nature of the interest, since it means that public opinion may be 
the only instrument by which society can attempt to influence their con-
duct.   
            I therefore adhere to the New York Times standard in the case of 
―public figures‖ as well as ―public officials.‖ 
Id. 
48 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-43; see Curtis, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (―All 
of us agree that the basic considerations underlying the First Amendment require that some 
limitations be placed on the application of state libel laws to ‗public figures‘ as well as ‗pub-
lic officials.‘ ‖). 
49 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
50 Id. at 348. 
51 Id. at 344-45. 
52 Id. at 351.  The Court also ruled that states may not permit recovery through liability 
without fault, which presumes damages, or imposes punitive damages.  Id. at 349. 
9
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famatory statements concerning private individuals due to the signifi-
cant state interest in compensating injury to their reputation, and held 
that states may define for themselves the appropriate standard of lia-
bility for a publisher of ―defamatory falsehood injurious to the repu-
tation of a private individual.‖53 
B.  The Fruition of the Barricade: Separating Fact and 
Opinion 
The United States Supreme Court in Gertz considered the ex-
tent of First Amendment protection against liability for defamation 
stemming from statements regarding private citizens and through dic-
ta ―elevated to constitutional principle the distinction between fact 
and opinion.‖54  Thus, the Court in Gertz ―confirm[ed] the existence 
of an absolute privilege for expressions of opinion.‖55  While the 
Court acknowledged the value of even pernicious opinions in society, 
it emphasized the lack of constitutional value in false statements of 
fact, emphasizing that ―[n]either the intentional lie nor the careless 
error materially advances society‘s interest in ‗uninhibited, robust, 
and wide open‘ debate on public issues.‖56 
Although the Court‘s holding did not explicitly state that a 
court must distinguish fact from opinion, through dicta it implicitly 
suggested that both federal and state courts have ―the duty as a matter 
of constitutional adjudication to distinguish facts from opinions in 
order to provide opinions with the requisite, absolute First Amend-
ment protection.‖57  However, Gertz did little to clarify how the dis-
tinction between fact and opinion should be drawn.58  Despite lack of 
 
53 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-46; see infra note 90 (extending the heightened burden for media 
defendants on matters of public concern to non-media defendants). 
54 Ollman, 750 F.2d at 975; see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325. 
55 Ollman, 750 F.2d at 1017, 1020 (―Gertz’ pronouncement that the First Amendment 
confers an absolute privilege on expressions of opinion stands as one of the cardinal prin-
ciples of free speech and press.‖). 
56 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340. 
57 Ollman, 750 F.2d at 975.  Thus, Gertz ―elevated to constitutional principle the distinc-
tion between fact and opinion, which at common law had formed the basis of the doctrine of 
fair comment.‖  Id. at 975.  At common law, the doctrine of fair comment ―bestowed quali-
fied immunity from libel actions as to certain types of opinions‖ to allow writers to freely 
express their views about subjects of public significance.  Id. at 974. 
58 Id. at 975.  While the Court in Gertz failed to provide a distinction between fact and 
opinion, in Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974), a case decided on 
the same day, the Court attempted to provide some guidance.  Letter Carriers involved a la-
10
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guidance, the majority of federal circuit courts have accepted Gertz’s 
protection of opinion as controlling law, but have grappled to define 
standards for separating fact from opinion.59 
In the aftermath of Gertz, both federal and state courts strug-
gle to navigate in ―largely uncharted seas‖ through adopting various 
approaches for distinguishing between fact and opinion.60  For exam-
ple, in Ollman v. Evans,61 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit, articulated a four-factor test for deciphering between ac-
tionable facts and protected opinions.62  The four elements articulated 
by the court include: (1) the common usage or meaning of the specif-
ic language of the challenged statement itself; (2) the degree to which 
the statements are verifiable; (3) the context in which the statement 
occurs; and (4) a consideration of the broader social context into 
which the statement fits.63  The court also noted that after determin-
ing that a statement is opinion it is often procedure to consider 
 
bor dispute that escalated when a newsletter was distributed which referenced the plaintiffs 
as ―scabs,‖ which it defined as ―a traitor to his God, his country, his family and his class.‖  
Id. at 267-68.  In analyzing whether the statements made were constitutionally protected, the 
Court considered the context of the communication and the typical language that would be 
used in the particular setting of a labor dispute.  Id. at 272.  Ultimately, the Court concluded 
that a reasonable reader would not have taken the statements made literally and would have 
understood that the words were ―merely rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative ex-
pression of the contempt felt by union members towards those who refuse to join.‖  Id. at 
285. 
59 Ollman, 758 F.2d at 974 n.6; see McBride v. Merrell Dow and Pharms., Inc., 717 F.2d 
1460, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Lewis v. Time Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 552-53 (9th Cir. 1983); 
Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 1983); Hammerhead Enters., Inc. v. Bre-
zenoff, 707 F.2d 33, 40 (2d Cir. 1983); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 
193 (1st Cir. 1982), aff’d on other grounds, 466 U.S. 485 (1984); Church of Scientology v. 
Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272, 1286 (5th Cir. 1981); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 642 (3d Cir. 
1980); Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1114 (6th Cir. 1978). 
60 Ollman, 750 F.2d at 977.  Courts have engaged in various techniques in an effort to dis-
tinguish fact from opinion.  Some courts have merely treated the distinction as a judgment 
call and avoided the need to create any particular theory, while other courts have focused on 
a single factor.  Compare Shiver v. Apalachee Publ‘g Co., 425 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. D.C. 1983) 
(determining that statements constituted opinion without utilizing any specific test in coming 
to its conclusion), with Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir. 1977) (adopt-
ing a single-factor test to verify the alleged defamatory statement).  However, other courts 
have adopted multi-factor tests that attempt to consider the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding the defamatory statement.  See, e.g., Info. Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer 
Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1980) (articulating three factors for determining 
whether a statement was a fact or opinion). 
61 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
62 Id. at 979. 
63 Id. 
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whether the opinion implies that it is based on undisclosed facts, be-
cause if so, it should not be wrapped ―in the mantle of the First 
Amendment‘s opinion privilege.‖64 
However, the court stated that this second inquiry concerning 
whether a statement is based on underlying undisclosed facts is su-
perfluous because factors one and two of the Ollman Test ―bear on 
the ability of a statement to carry factual implications.‖65  Moreover, 
factors three and four also affect whether a reasonable reader will in-
fer that the statement is based on undisclosed facts.66  After a tho-
rough analysis under the factors set forth, the court concluded that the 
statements made constituted opinion.67  The court emphasized the du-
ty ― ‗to assure to the freedoms of speech and press that ‗breathing 
space‘ essential to their fruitful exercise,‘ ‖ which is impeded upon 
when one strives to ―squeeze factual content from a single sentence 
in a column that is otherwise clearly opinion.‖68 
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,69 the Supreme Court cla-
rified that ―[there is no] wholesale defamation exemption for any-
thing that might be labeled opinion.‖70  Thus, a defamatory statement 
masquerading under the disguise of an opinion earns no greater pro-
 
64 Id. at 984; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (2011) (―A defamatory com-
munication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this na-
ture is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis 
for the opinion.‖). 
65 Ollman, 750 F.2d at 985. 
66 Id.  In applying this test, the court found that the allegedly defamatory statements made 
by two newspaper columnists regarding a political science professor that appeared in the 
Washington Post and other newspapers across the nation were opinion, and thus constitu-
tionally protected.  Id. at 971.  In its analysis, first, the court indicated that the column ap-
peared on the Op-Ed page of the newspaper, which is understood by the average reader as a 
forum of opinion and is not viewed as ―hard news like those printed on the front page or 
elsewhere in the news sections of the newspaper.‖  Id. at 986.  Moreover, the court indicated, 
that the entire column viewed as a whole provided the impression that the columnists merely 
questioned the intentions of the professor; it did not suggest the columnists‘ conclusive firs-
thand knowledge.  Id. at 987. 
67 Ollman, 750 F.2d. at 990. 
68 Id. at 991 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342).  
69 497 U.S. 1 (1990).  The case concerned alleged defamatory statements made by a col-
umnist for an Ohio Newspaper concerning a high school wrestling coach, regarding a brawl 
at a match that resulted in the hospitalization of multiple team members and suspension of 
the school from participation in future tournaments.  Id. at 3-4.  The allegations were that the 
coach lied under oath in a judicial proceeding about the incident.  Id.  Milkovich filed suit 
for defamation, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the recognition of a 
constitutionally required opinion exception to the application of defamation laws.  Id. at 6-7. 
70 Id. at 18. 
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tection simply because a speaker presents it is an opinion.71  Howev-
er, the Court rejected the contention that the First Amendment re-
quires a separate opinion privilege limiting the application of state 
defamation and reasoned that the ― ‗breathing space‘ which 
‗[f]reedoms of expression require in order to survive,‘ is adequately 
secured by existing constitutional doctrine without the creation of an 
artificial dichotomy between ‗opinion‘ and fact.‖72  After rejecting 
the notion that ―in every defamation case the First Amendment man-
dates an inquiry into whether a statement is ‗opinion‘ or ‗fact,‘ ‖ the 
Court indicated that henceforth, the inquiry should be whether the de-
fendant‘s statements are false accusations.73  Hence, courts should not 
assess whether the alleged defamatory statements constitute opinion, 
but instead whether the statements made contain ―the sort of loose, 
figurative, or hyperbolic language which would negate the impres-
sion that the writer was seriously maintaining that petitioner commit-
ted‖ the acts being alleged.74  Thus, after Milkovich, statements that 
contain or imply assertions of provably false-fact will likely be ac-
tionable for defamation.75  While Milkovich presented an opportunity 
for the Supreme Court to clarify the extent to which opinions can be 
expressed without fear of future litigation, the Court did little to re-
solve the issue, prompting state courts to independently implement 
their own jurisdictional standards. 
III.  The New York Approach to Defamation: 
Fortifying the Protection of Free Speech 
It is well established that matters of free expression are a mat-
ter of state common law and state constitutional law, leaving the Su-
preme Court under the federal constitution to fix only the minimum 
 
71 Id. at 18-19 (―[It] would be destructive of the law of libel if a writer could escape lia-
bility for accusations of [defamatory conduct] simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the 
words ‗I think.‘ ‖). 
72 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19 (quoting Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 
(1986)). 
73 See id. at 21 (stating that lower courts have mistakenly relied on the dictum of Gertz). 
74 Id. 
75 Ultimately, the Court found that the column strongly suggested that Milkovich perjured 
himself because it was not presented in any way that would lead a reasonable reader to be-
lieve it was not true.  Id. at 21.  Thus, because the connotation of the column that Milkovich 
committed perjury was sufficiently capable of being proven true or false, the statement was 
actionable.  Id. 
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standards applicable to the states, and allowing state courts to sup-
plement those standards however they see fit.76  New York State has 
adopted a broader protection of free speech than required under the 
First Amendment.77  This broad protection is embodied in the New 
York State Constitution, which states that ―[e]very citizen may freely 
speak, write, and publish . . . sentiments on all subjects,‖78 and re-
flects the deliberate choice of the New York State Constitutional 
Convention to articulate a more affirmative declaration of liberty of 
the press rather than merely adopting the language of the First 
Amendment.79  It is a long tradition of New York State courts in de-
famation actions to consider statements in their context and examine 
their effect on a reasonable reader rather than viewing them in isola-
tion.80 
A. Adopting the Requirement of Actual Malice: 
Public Officials and Public Matters 
New York Courts follow the precedent set by Sullivan in 
weighing claims for defamation regarding public officials.  In Rinaldi 
v. Holt, Rinehart, & Winston,81 the New York Court of Appeals used 
the standard announced in Sullivan, which prevents a public official 
from recovering damages for defamatory falsehoods relating to his 
official misconduct unless he proves that the statement was made 
 
76 Immuno, 567 N.E.2d at 1277. 
77 Id. at 1278. 
78 N.Y. CONST. art I. § 8. 
79 Immuno, 567 N.E.2d at 1277-78; see O‘Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 523 N.E.2d 
277, 280-81 (N.Y. 1988); 
The expansive language of our State constitutional guarantee, its formu-
lation and adoption prior to the Supreme Court‘s application of the First 
Amendment to the States, the recognition in very early New York histo-
ry of a constitutionally guaranteed liberty of the press, and the consistent 
tradition in this State of providing the broadest possible protection to 
―the sensitive role of gathering and disseminating news of public 
events,‖ all call for particular vigilance by the courts of this State in sa-
feguarding the free press against undue interference. 
O’Neill, 523 N.E.2d at 280-81. 
80 Immuno, 567 N.E.2d at 1281; see, e.g., James v. Gannett Co., 353 N.E.2d 834, 837-38 
(1976) (indicating that the statement should be examined in the context of the entire publica-
tion). 
81 366 N.E.2d 1299 (1977). 
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with actual malice.82  The plaintiff, a New York Supreme Court Jus-
tice, brought an action for defamation claiming he was libeled in the 
book ―Cruel and Unusual Justice,‖ which was authored by Jack New-
field and published by Holt, Rinehart & Winston.83  In the book, the 
Justice was described as being ―very tough on long-haired attorneys 
and black defendants, especially on questions of bail, probation, and 
sentencing.‖84  It went on to charge that the Justice‘s ―judicial temper 
softens remarkably before heroin dealers and organized crime fig-
ures.‖85  Despite the defamatory nature of the statements, the court 
asserted that because a public official ―runs the risk of closer public 
scrutiny than might otherwise be the case,‖ the Justice could not re-
cover from the defendants ―for simply expressing their opinion of his 
judicial performance, no matter how unreasonable, extreme or erro-
neous these opinions might be.‖86  Thus, through most of his criticism 
the author merely set forth the basis for his belief that the Justice was 
incompetent and should be removed from office, allowing each read-
er to draw his own conclusion.87 
Further, in Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc.,88 the 
New York Court of Appeals held that on matters of public concern, a 
plaintiff may only recover if he or she establishes ―that the publisher 
acted in a grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration for 
the standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily 
followed by responsible parties.‖89  Although the language in Chapa-
deau suggests that the fault standard only applies to media defen-
dants, courts have implemented it in cases involving matters of public 
concern for non-media defendants.90  However, neither the Supreme 
 
82 Id. at 1305. 
83 Id. at 1303. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Rinaldi, 366 N.E.2d at 1306. 
87 Id.  According to the court, the assertions in the book claiming that the Justice was 
―probably corrupt,‖ were likely to portray to the reader that the Justice had committed illegal 
and unethical actions of criminal activity, and therefore were not part of the constitutionally 
protected opinion.  Id. at 1307.  Moreover, because the burden of proof lies upon the plain-
tiff, the court concluded that the Justice failed to present sufficient evidence as to the falsity 
and maliciousness of the accusations.  Id. 
88 341 N.E.2d 569 (N.Y. 1975). 
89 Id. at 571. 
90 See, e.g., McGill v. Parker, 582 N.Y.S.2d 91, 97-98 (App. Div. 1st Dep‘t 1992) (―There 
is no reason, however, why the Constitution should be construed to provide greater protec-
tion to the media in defamation suits than to others exercising their freedom of              
15
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Court nor the New York Court of Appeals has addressed the issue ―of 
whether the constitutional limitations apply to nonmedia defen-
dants.‖91 
B. Actionable Fact Versus Protected Opinion 
The Gertz precedent—stating expressions of pure opinion are 
not actionable—is followed by New York courts, which have at-
tempted to distinguish protected pure opinions from actionable mixed 
opinions.92  In Steinhilber, the New York Court of Appeals empha-
sized that in distinguishing fact from opinion courts must refrain from 
adopting a rigid set of criteria and instead maintain ―the flexibility to 
consider the relevant factors and to accord each the degree of impor-
tance which the specific circumstances warrant.‖93  In evaluating the 
statement made by defendants, which labeled the plaintiff, a member 
of a union who violated its rules by continuing to work while the un-
ion was on strike, as a scab that lacked ―talent, ambition, and initia-
tive,‖ the court articulated its own broad standard for distinguishing 
protected expressions of opinion from actionable assertions of fact.94  
The court stated: 
A ―pure opinion‖ is a statement of opinion which is 
accompanied by a recitation of the facts upon which it 
is based.  An opinion not accompanied by such a fac-
tual recitation may, nevertheless, be ―pure opinion‖ if 
it does not imply that it is based upon undisclosed 
facts.  When, however, the statement of opinion im-
plied that it is based upon facts which justify the opi-
 
speech . . . .‖); Pollnow v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d 11, 15-16 (App. 
Div. 2d Dep‘t 1985) (concluding that ―a nonmedia individual defendant who utilizes a public 
medium for the publication of matter deemed defamatory should be accorded the same con-
stitutional privilege as the medium itself‖). 
91 Pollnow, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 16. 
92 Steinhilber, 501 N.E.2d at 552. 
93 Id. at 554.  Although the court advocated a formulistic approach in distinguishing fact 
from opinion, it noted that other courts have eschewed from this approach adopting a specif-
ic criteria and setting forth general guidelines.  See, e.g., Mr. Chow of N.Y. v. Ste. Jour Azur 
S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 1985) (adopting the Ollman Test); Control Corp., 611 F.2d 
at 784 (adopting a multifactor totality of the circumstances test); Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 
882, 895-96 (2d Cir. 1976) (looking at the context of the statement and whether the state-
ment conveyed could be interpreted in multiple ways and was ―loosely definable‖). 
94 Steinhilber, 502 N.E.2d at 552. 
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nion but are unknown to those reading or hearing it, it 
is a ‗mixed opinion‘ and is actionable.  The actionable 
element of a ―mixed opinion‖ is not the false opinion 
itself—it is the implication that the speaker knows cer-
tain facts, unknown to his audience, which support his 
opinion and are detrimental to the person about whom 
he is speaking.95 
Ultimately, the court concluded that the criticism of the plaintiff un-
ion worker was ―expressed in the form of heavy-handed and nonsen-
sical humor,‖ and therefore, the statement ―was not intended to be 
understood as an assertion of fact or as opinion based on undisclosed 
facts.‖96  Moreover, the court concluded that the circumstances and 
broader social context of the statement, an ongoing dispute in which 
the union sought to punish a former member, confirmed the conclu-
sion that the statement would not be taken literally.97 
In Sandals Resorts International Ltd. v. Google, Inc.,98 the 
Appellate Division, First Department, applied the standard articulated 
in Steinhilber.99  Sandals Resorts International, a corporation that op-
erates multiple resorts in Jamaica, sought disclosure of information 
that would enable it to bring an action for defamation against the 
holder of a Google Gmail account who sent an email criticizing the 
corporation‘s treatment of native Jamaican employees.100  Essentially, 
 
95 Id. at 552-53.  Subsequently, in Immuno, the New York Court of Appeals clarified that 
the New York State Constitution provides broader speech protections than the United States 
Constitution under Milkovich, and announced that ―the standard articulated and applied in 
Steinhilber, furnishes the operative standard in this State for separating actionable fact from 
protected opinion.‖  Immuno, 567 N.E.2d at 1280. 
96 Steinhilber, 501 N.E.2d at 555. 
97 Id.  Compare Springer v. Almontaser, 904 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 
2010) (concluding that a reasonable person would not view the alleged defamatory state-
ments as conveying facts about the plaintiffs, but rather as mere opinion because the state-
ments were made in the context of a public campaign); Brian v. Richardson, 660 N.E.2d 
1126, 1131 (N.Y. 1995) (concluding that the defamation claim against the defendant was 
properly dismissed because the purpose of the article was to advocate an independent go-
vernmental investigation and a reasonable reader would understand the statements ―as mere 
allegations to be investigated rather than facts‖), with Gross, 623 N.E.2d at 1166 (finding 
plaintiff‘s complaint had both actionable assertions of fact as well as non-actionable opinions 
and conclusions because the articles contained defamatory assertions that a reasonable reader 
would understand to be advanced as statements of fact). 
98 925 N.Y.S.2d 407 (App. Div. 1st Dep‘t 2011). 
99 Id. at 413. 
100 Id. at 409. 
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the email stated that the foreign corporation which owns the resort 
company limits hiring to foreigners for its senior positions and hires 
natives only for menial jobs at the resorts despite the subsidies paid to 
the Sandals resorts by Jamaican taxpayers.101   
Although the court agreed that the connotation of the email 
conveyed that Sandals engaged in racist hiring practices, it declared 
that the determination of whether there is a valid action for defama-
tion does not simply turn on whether statements made in the writing 
may be understood to state facts.102  The court stated that ―[e]ven ap-
parent statements of fact may assume the character of statements of 
opinion, and thus be privileged, when made in public debate, heated 
labor dispute, or other circumstances in which an audience may antic-
ipate [the use] of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole.‖103  Alterna-
tively, the court insisted that the writing must be construed as a whole 
and considered in the overall context of the publication to determine 
―whether the reasonable reader would have believed that the chal-
lenged statements were conveying facts about the libel plaintiff.‖104  
Moreover, it advised that courts should consider the communication 
in its entirety, paying special attention to the tone in which the mes-
sage is conveyed.105 
In following these criteria, the court found that the email was 
merely an exercise in rhetoric that sought to raise questions in the 
mind of the reader regarding the role of Jamaican nationals in San-
dal‘s resorts.106  The court further indicated that the underlying tone 
of the email exposed the ―anger and resentment‖ of the writer, con-
veying that it was purely an expression of personal views.107  In fact, 
the email did not imply it was based on undisclosed facts; rather, it 
provided hyperlinks to demonstrate the facts upon which it was 
based, further affirming that it constituted pure opinion.108  Finally, 
the broader context of the email involved the ―freewheeling, any-
thing-goes‖ nature of the Internet, which is a typical forum for voic-
ing opinions through techniques such as blogging, further confirming 
 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 414. 
103 Sandals, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 414. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 415. 
107 Id. 
108 Sandals, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 415. 
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the conclusion that the email was purely an expression of opinion.109 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Gorilla v. New York Times highlights a prominent issue in lit-
igation—whether alleged defamatory statements constitute fact or 
opinion: a distinction that determines the fate of any plaintiff who 
seeks compensation for damage caused to their forever-tainted repu-
tation.  The Supreme Court has implemented ―constitutional limits on 
the type of speech that may be actionable under state defamation 
law.‖110  There are three types of speech that do not constitute action-
able claims for defamation: rhetorical hyperbole or imaginative ex-
pression, pure opinion that does not imply a provably false fact, and 
statements that cannot be reasonably interpreted as conveying facts 
about the plaintiff.111   
However, the New York State Constitution provides greater 
protection for statements of opinion than is required under federal 
law.112  The New York Court of Appeals articulated the standard to 
distinguish between fact and protected opinion, mandating that courts 
assess whether a reasonable reader would have believed that the chal-
lenged statements were conveying facts about the plaintiff.113  Thus, 
the disparity between the New York standard and the federal standard 
is that New York courts analyze ―the full context of the challenged 
speech whereas the federal approach [articulated in Milkovich mere-
ly] requires a determination as to whether the precise words express 
or imply a provably false fact.‖114  Thus, under the New York State 
Constitution, courts have adopted a more flexible test that is emphati-
cally more defensive of ―the cherished constitutional guarantee of 
 
109 Id. at 415; see Eirik Cheverud, Cohen v. Google, Inc., 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 333, 
335-36 (2011) (stating that the conflict between First Amendment rights and defamatory 
speech arises more frequently due to the distinct culture of internet communications). 
110 NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS – Civil 3:24 (2011). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 See supra note 95. 
114 NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS – Civil 3:24, supra note 110.  Compare Mil-
kovich, 497 U.S. at 19-20 (―[A] statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern 
which does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional 
protection.‖), with Brian, 660 N.E.2d at 1131 (analyzing the full context of the challenged 
speech). 
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free speech‖ than that of the Supreme Court.115 
 
Tiffany Frigenti
*
 
 
 
115 Immuno, 567 N.E.2d at 1282. 
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